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Using Markets to Balance Agricultural Expansion 
and Forest Conservation 
Guilherme DePaula and Leandro Justino 
gdepaula@iastate.edu; leandrojpveloso@gmail.com
HOW CAN we balanceagricultural expansionand forest conservation in
developing countries? Brazil has a
productive agricultural sector with
potential for expansion and a rich
endowment of natural vegetation
resources located on private land.
According to the last Agricultural
Census, Brazilian farms possessed
about 98.5 million hectares of
forestland (IBGE 2006), a little
less than the combined land area
of France and Germany. In 1975,
when agricultural production was
concentrated in southeast Brazil
(Figure 1), about 60 percent of
farmland was native vegetation.
However, since then, technological
change and market reforms have
enabled national agricultural
expansion. By 2006, the share of native
vegetation within private properties
had decreased to 46 percent (IBGE
1975; 2006). 
In this study, we assess Brazil’s
application of transferable development
rights (TDR), a tradable allowance
for the conversion of one hectare of
natural vegetation into agriculture and a
promising market-based instrument that
supports both the conservation of natural
vegetation and agricultural expansion.
TDR allows a farmer to offset the
conversion of one hectare of forestland
to agriculture by buying one TDR from a
farmer willing to maintain or convert less
productive land into natural vegetation. 
The New Brazilian Forestry 
Code and TDRs 
The forestry code, which regulates
private property land use in Brazil,
Figure 1.  Share of agricultural land within private properties in Brazil.
Source: Agricultural Censuses (IBGE 1975; 2006). 
aims to preserve the endowment
of natural vegetation inside farms
given the value of biodiversity and
ecosystem services such as freshwater
protection and carbon sequestration.
The code speciϐies two land diversion
requirements, the legal reserve and the
areas of permanent preservation. The
legal reserve requirement speciϐies,
at the biome level, the proportion of
farmland that must be preserved in
the original natural vegetation. The
reserve requirement is 80 percent in the
Amazon, 35 percent in the Savanna, and
20 percent in the remaining biomes. 
The new Brazilian forestry 
code, approved in 2012 (Law 
12.651/2012), allows TDR trading to
ensure compliance with land diversion
requirements. For example, a farmer
with a reforestation gap of 100 hectares
could meet his or her obligations either
by converting 100 hectares of his or
her farm into natural vegetation or by
purchasing 100 TDRs in the market.
TDR implementation depends on the
regulation of the Brazilian TDR market
and completion of a national registry of
rural properties. All Brazilian farmers
must complete their registration by
December 31, 2018. 
Soares-Filho et al. (2014) integrate 
multiple data sources at the watershed 
level to analyze changes to the Brazilian 
forestry code and estimate the resulting 
reforestation gap by biome and state. 
Our analysis extends their work by 
simulating the potential of the TDR 
instrument for forestry conservation 
using farm-level census data. We also 
estimate the savings in compliance costs 
using TDRs. 
Supply of Forestland 
The gains from trading in the TDR 
market depend on differences in the 
opportunity cost of forestland; that is, 
the foregone agricultural proϐits from 
keeping land as natural vegetation. We 
model the opportunity cost of forestland 
by estimating a land-use model for 
Brazil using census data and then 
simulate the share of forestland within 
each farm at different TDR prices. 
The result is the supply function of 
forestland in Brazil. Figure 2 shows the 
simulated supply functions of forestland 
for the entire Savanna biome (solid 
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line) and the Savanna biome within the 
state of Mato Grosso (dotted-and-dashed 
line). Mato Grosso is important because 
it is the largest producer of soy and 
corn in Brazil. The solid line assumes 
one TDR market for the entire Savanna 
biome, whereas the dotted-and-dashed 
line models a TDR market only for Mato 
Grosso. The dotted line represents 
a TDR model for Mato Grosso with 
supply restricted based on the reserve 
requirements. In such a restricted 
market, farmers can only sell TDRs for 
acreage above the required 35 percent 
share of natural vegetation. 
For example, a TDR price of $100
would incentivize Savanna farmers to 
reforest 17 percent of farmland. The 
lowest productivity land is reforested 
ϐirst, and the supply function becomes 
more inelastic as we move to highly 
productive farmland. The vertical dashed 
line represents the reforestation gap 
for Mato Grosso. Soares-Filho et al. 
(2014) estimate a reforestation gap 
of 1.6 million hectares in Mato Grosso 
and 3.7 million hectares in the entire 
Savanna. This reforestation gap captures 
demand for forestland implicit in the 
forestry code. We estimate equilibrium 
TDR prices of $24, $96, and $156 
for the Savanna, Mato Grosso, and 
Mato Grosso restricted TDR markets, 
respectively. Without a TDR market,
each farmer would have to reforest up 
to the 35 percent requirement level. 
We estimate a compliance cost of $1.7 
billion for Mato Grosso without TDRs, 
using median land prices. With a TDR 
Figure 2. Supply of forestland in the Savanna and Mato Grosso. 
market, the compliance cost reduces 
to approximately $250 million based 
on the Mato Grosso restricted market,
the most likely design. Implementing a 
TDR market within a large geographical 
scope (i.e., crossing state boundaries) is 
operationally and politically challenging 
because monitoring and enforcement 
capabilities vary across states and 
there is potential for the concentration 
of agricultural production in a few 
locations. The implementation of a TDR 
market at the state/biome level would 
thus reduce compliance costs by 75 
percent in Mato Grosso. 
The TDR mechanism incorporates 
the value of agricultural expansion into 
an environmental policy to balance 
environmental and development 
objectives. Further, the market for 
TDRs can be extended to incorporate 
the additional beneϐits of reforestation 
such as carbon sequestration and the 
development of biodiversity corridors. 
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